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Abstract
For years, there has been a lack of representation for indigenous peoples in communities,
and most importantly in parliament. This is a very common trait in the South American Andes,
which houses the largest number of indigenous groups in the continent. This thesis focuses on
Ecuador and Bolivia due to their indigenous population and their history, or lack thereof, with
indigenous people in parliament. For my hypothesis, I argue that parliamentary representation of
indigenous peoples, can help ensure that their rights are protected, and their unique interests are
heard and translated into relevant policies, while at the same time preventing conflict. I also
argue that underrepresentation is likely due to a combination of actual barriers to participation
and an overall sense of alienation from mainstream electoral processes. While Bolivian
democracy was more stable and inclusive under the Morales government than under previous
ones, this study finds that the influence of other government officials and economic needs played
a part in changes for the rights of the indigenous. The study shows that Bolivian politics revolved
around the increase, and then decrease, in indigenous rights under their first indigenous
president, Evo Morales. In this thesis, I also follow Ecuadorian politics involving indigenous
groups. Lastly, the thesis examines a comparison between the two states and how they relate
historically and politically to each other.
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Political Representation for Indigenous Peoples in the Andes
CHAPTER ONE: Introduction

The representation of indigenous peoples in parliament is first and foremost a reflection
and symbol of the State’s recognition of the unique interests, needs and rights of indigenous
peoples. Such representation presupposes the recognition of indigenous peoples as a distinct
identity and legal category in each country. Indigenous peoples are all too often lumped together
with minorities or other vulnerable sectors of society. Traditional and historical discrimination
against indigenous candidates, the limited impact that indigenous representatives have had on
indigenous peoples’ lives, and a general lack of confidence in national decision-making bodies,
where experience may be at odds with existing indigenous decision-making institutions, may
explain the relative apathy of indigenous voters and the low representation of indigenous peoples
in parliament.
I argue that parliamentary representation of indigenous peoples, a traditionally
underrepresented and historically marginalized group, can help ensure that their rights are
protected, and their unique interests are heard and translated into relevant policies, while at the
same time preventing conflict between government officials and the Indigenous constituents they
represent. Indigenous representation in parliament can also benefit society at large, because
indigenous practices and knowledge can provide solutions to complex environmental,
developmental and governance problems that all societies face today.
I also argue that underrepresentation is likely due to a combination of actual barriers to
participation and an overall sense of alienation from mainstream electoral processes. Barriers to
participation include, but are not limited to, undue conditions for voter registration, access to the
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voting booth in rural areas, the political parties’ unwillingness to find indigenous candidates or
place them high on their party lists, and a lack of adequate political party funding.
The methodology for this paper will consist of a Qualitative Study. The sources I have
included in this research are books regarding South American politics. There are also journal
articles based on indigenous rights, Ecuadorian and Bolivian politics, as well as United Nations
declarations and forums that have discussed Indigenous heritage and definitions.
The Andes is a region that spans across South America from Colombia through Chile. It
has been historically and culturally attached to many indigenous populations surrounding those
countries. Their rich culture and dialects have been passed on through many generations, even
through the colonization period by Spain and Portugal. Although many aspects of South
American life have become Europeanized, indigenous groups still try to maintain the familiarity
of their ancestors through much of their daily activities. Today, there are about 30-40 million
indigenous people in South America, yet they are underrepresented in their respective
governments. Andean indigenous groups are an inherently complex issue, especially in Bolivia
and Ecuador which have similar colonial legacies and have developed along comparable political
and economic trajectories. Indigenous communities need political access to fight for their rights
and to hold their governments accountable. The key to the actualization of human rights for
indigenous peoples lies within their greater political inclusion. The significance of political
access for indigenous people’s human rights is threefold. First, the existence of relatively stable
democracies in Bolivia and Ecuador present opportunities for indigenous communities to
participate politically through legitimate means. Second, only the indigenous communities truly
know the unique challenges they face and must have political representation to voice these
concerns and to ensure legislative change. Finally, without the specific knowledge that is held by
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indigenous peoples, outsiders have few opportunities to appropriately and accurately represent
them. I argue that greater participation by indigenous people in political life has a direct effect on
their human rights protection and land protection from corporations. This thesis will examine the
hierarchical status of indigenous peoples in Bolivia and Ecuador, the status of their human rights,
and the obstacles that must be overcome for them to have full political access.
In 2007, the United Nations put forth the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples. According to Article 43 of the declaration, it is made to enshrine the rights that
“constitute the minimum standards for the survival, dignity and well-being of the indigenous
peoples of the world” (UNDRIP, 2008, p. 14). The UNDRIP establishes a universal framework
of minimum survival standards for the dignity and well-being of the world's indigenous peoples.
It is the most comprehensive international instrument on indigenous peoples' collective rights,
including the rights to self-determination, traditional lands and culture. The Declaration is the
product of almost 25 years of deliberation by U.N. member states and indigenous groups. It is
responsible for the thousands of indigenous groups worldwide who may feel unheard or
misrepresented.
Because of the diversity of indigenous peoples, the U.N. body has not officially adopted a
definition for the term indigenous. However, they have developed an understanding of this term
based on the following:
• Self- identification as indigenous peoples at the individual level and accepted by the
community as their member.
• Historical continuity with pre-colonial and/or pre-settler societies
• Strong link to territories and surrounding natural resources
• Distinct social, economic or political systems
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• Distinct language, culture and beliefs
• Form non-dominant groups of societies
• Resolve to maintain and reproduce their ancestral environments and systems as
distinctive peoples and communities (UNDRIP, 2008, p. 14).
According to the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, “the term ‘indigenous’ has
prevailed as a generic term for many years. In some countries, there may be preference for other
terms including tribes, first peoples/nations, aboriginals, ethnic groups, adivasi, janajati., etc., but
for all practical purposes can be used interchangeably with ‘indigenous peoples’ (United
Nations, 2006, pp. 1-2). However, in some cases, the notion of being termed “indigenous” has
negative connotations and some people may choose not to reveal or define their origin. We
should be able to respect those choices all the while working against the discrimination of
indigenous peoples.
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CHAPTER TWO: Literature Review

Deborah Yashar, professor of politics at Princeton, examines the changing terms, and
scope of ethnic representation in Bolivia and Ecuador. Her chapter, “Indigenous Politics in the
Andes: Changing Patterns of Recognition, Reform, and Representation”, discusses how these
Latin American states wrote indigenous people out of formal politics only to be confronted at the
end of the twentieth century with the rise of significant indigenous movements demanding
recognition, representation and reform. Yashar argues that the mobilization of indigenous and
popular communities is both a means of widening the democratic spectrum and a deep source of
political tension and highlights the desire of some indigenous groups to be represented by
officials with the same ethnicity as them (Yashar, 2006, pp. 257-292).
As indigenous groups move toward inclusion and equality in politics, their respective
governments are facing criticism for the stances they take that fail the interest of indigenous
people. John Crabtree’s article states that the “governments of both Andean countries face
criticism for policies which seek to boost investment but fail adequately to take into account the
interests of local people, who say these projects threaten their physical and social environment”
(Crabtree, 2012, pp.1). The governments elected with the support of indigenous populations have
taken steps to enshrine indigenous rights in their respective legal codes. In Ecuador, President
Rafael Correa reformed his country’s constitution, extending indigenous rights. As in Bolivia,
the 2008 constitution in Ecuador states - in an echo of the International Labor Organization's
convention no. 169 - that indigenous peoples should have the right to "free, informed and prior
consultation" where development projects take place on or under their lands. Crabtree also states
that “the governments of Bolivia and Ecuador reflect aspects of what has been called the "pink
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wave" in Latin America, a reversion against the free-wheeling neo-liberal policies in vogue up
until the early years of the new millennium” (Crabtree, 2012, pp.1). Both countries have pursued
policies highly critical of the United States and its policies towards Latin America.
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) is an
international instrument adopted by the United Nations on September 13, 2007, to enshrine,
according to Article 43, the rights that “constitute the minimum standards for the survival,
dignity and well-being of the indigenous peoples of the world.” The UNDRIP protects collective
rights that may not be addressed in other human rights charters that emphasize individual rights,
and also safeguards the individual rights of indigenous people. However, it is not a legally
binding document under international law (United Nations General Assembly, 2008, pp.14).
The United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues provided an information
sheet on the proper understanding of the term indigenous. There is no specific definition
provided by the UN for the word indigenous, instead it has key terms that can be used to help
identify these groups. It includes, self- identification as indigenous peoples at the individual level
and accepted by the community as their member, historical continuity with pre-colonial and/or
pre-settler societies, strong link to territories and surrounding natural resources, distinct social,
economic or political systems, distinct language, culture and beliefs, form non-dominant groups
of society, and lastly, resolve to maintain and reproduce their ancestral environments and
systems as distinctive peoples and communities (United Nations, 2006, pp. 1-2).
Aside from the United Nations, there are many organizations that work on improving and
fighting for the rights of underrepresented groups. Most of the time they are non-governmental
organizations. Minority Rights Group International is an international human rights organization
founded with the objective of working to secure rights for ethnic, national, religious and
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linguistic minorities and indigenous peoples around the world. Their website provides data and
critical information that can help us better understand the circumstances these groups face daily.
Because many of us can be so out of touch with this topic, they provide the knowledge that can
keep us informed (Minority Rights Group International, n.d, minorityrights.org/country/ecuador).
The Sheffield Institute for International Development is another group that provides
research on indigenous groups from developing countries. In a Bolivian census conducted in
2012, it showed that there was a 20% decrease in indigenous self-identification. Researcher
Lorenza Fontana worked with SIID to map the hypothesis of the dramatic decrease that occurred
in a heavily indigenous country. She had found that the wording of the census questions could
have thrown many of those answering off. However, there are others who believe that the
questioning was a tactic move for the government to seem more mestizo as opposed to
indigenous (Fontana, 2013, para.1).
Peter DeShazo concisely summarizes a series of expert panels on the status of indigenous
politics in the Andean region (DeShazo, 2009, pp. 4-13). Each panel addressed a country in the
region, namely Bolivia, Peru, or Ecuador. The consensus of the panelists is that conditions have
been more favorable in Bolivia and Ecuador for indigenous groups to mobilize than in Peru. The
impediments to indigenous groups in Peru include: President Garcia's "anti-indigenous policy;"
media portrayal of this group as violent and disinterested in dialogue; and the geographical
divide between indigenous groups in the highlands and those in the Amazon region. The
panelists also conclude that indigenous mobilization creates a great backlash against neo-liberal
policies that have been adopted by their governments. Ultimately, the future for indigenous
political participation looks stable in Bolivia and Ecuador but some experts do not foresee
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indigenous parties having a successful presidential candidate anytime soon, even after Evo
Morales in Bolivia. DeShazo creates a fascinating summary of this prestigious conference.
In 2019, the Waorani indigenous group of the Ecuadorian Amazon won a landmark case.
After long protesting oil extraction in its territory, the community is suing three government
bodies - the Ministry of Energy and Non-renewable Natural Resources, the Secretary of
Hydrocarbons and the Ministry of Environment - for violating their rights and putting their
territory up for an international oil auction. The group marched to the court house with
supporters dressed in their traditional clothing made of tree materials on their land. Kimberely
Brown, a reporter for Al Jazeera covered the historic win for the Waorani (Brown, 2019).
A very valuable source of information are the country reports in the Office of the High
Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) website. It shows reports from visits made by the
Special Rapporteur about human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people. This
article informs the public about the status of indigenous people in Ecuador and how oil
exploration is impacting their wellbeing. According to the Special Rapporteur, Jose Amaya, “the
purpose of the visit was to better gain an understanding of the situation of the human rights of the
indigenous peoples of Ecuador through discussions with various social players on issues such as
the effects of the 1998 Ecuadorian Constitution, which recognizes the collective rights of
indigenous peoples; their access to justice; their rights to land and natural resources; the impact
of the oil industry on their communities; and concerns over negotiations on the free trade
agreement with the United States of America” (Amaya, 2009, pp.5).
The Federation of Human Rights is a non-governmental federation for human rights
organizations. Founded in 1922, FIDH is the second oldest international human rights
organization worldwide after Anti-Slavery International. In 2018, they conducted a case study
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based on 18 projects that were supported by Chinese banks for development on indigenous lands
in countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru. Along with various social
organizations from Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Argentina and Brazil, FIDH has produced a report
that reveals human rights and environmental abuses by Chinese mining and oil corporations with
the complicity of the states of the region. The report, entitled Evaluation of the Extraterritorial
Obligations of the People’s Republic of China: Case Studies from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Ecuador and Peru, denounces some “knowingly violating behaviors” and the lack of willpower
of the Asian State for monitoring and enforcing the minimum standards required by its
companies and banks (International Federation for Human Rights, 2012).
The Ministry of the Netherlands developed a study through their Policy and Operations
Evaluation Department about the equity, accountability and effectiveness in decentralization
policies in Bolivia. A section in the paper is specifically on the Law of Popular Participation. The
Law of Popular Participation, announced in 1994, came at a time when local government in
Bolivia was relatively non-existent. This law established a new standard for resource allocation,
mandating 20 percent of national tax revenue to be transferred to municipalities; more
responsibilities regarding health and infrastructure shifted to the municipalities; local
representatives oversaw decision making processes; lastly, additional municipalities were created
to include suburbs and rural areas (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 2012, p. 13).
In “Losing Members and Winning Votes?” Diana Davila Gordillo examines the
representative capacity of the Ecuadorian party Pachakutik, formed in 1996 as the political
branch of Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), deemed the “most
consequential indigenous movement in Latin America” (Yashar, 2005, p.260). The party was
very successful in its first years such that in 2002 the candidate the Pachakutik party supported in
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an electoral alliance won the presidency. However, the alliance dissolved six months after the
candidate took office, and Pachakutik revised its policy of forming electoral alliances (DavilaGordillo, 2018).
In 2008, Morales implemented the Family, Community, and Intercultural Health (SAFCI)
model. SAFCI is a health policy which is constituted in the new way of feeling, thinking,
understanding and doing health. Reciprocally, it complements and articulates the health
personnel and traditional doctors of the Native Peasant Nations and Indigenous Peoples with the
person, family, community, mother earth and cosmos (Ministerio de Salud y Deportes, 2013,
pp.1). In 2013, the Bolivian Ministry of Health distributed a report that described a general
framework for the implementation and application of specific strategies and policies aimed at
different vulnerable populations and age groups. The goals of the policy include: strengthened
primary health care; full participation and empowerment of the community in health-related
issues; and reduced morbidity and mortality for women and children (United Nations Population
Fund/Every Woman Every Child, 2016).
Under the Morales administration, indigenous healthcare beliefs and practices stepped
out from long shadows cast by colonialism and racism. Along with his implementation of more
diversity and inclusion of indigenous people in parliament, he promoted the fusion of indigenous
medicine to be practiced along with Western biomedicine. Morales’s revolutionary objective was
to create a new plurinational healthcare system (Hartmann, 2019). In Hartmann’s article, he
explains how Morales achieved this during his presidency and how the healthcare system is
under threat under Bolivia’s new government.
The indigenous movement in Ecuador notoriously lost its political influence during
Rafael Correa’s government, which is counterintuitive, as both actors – in theory – shared a
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similar political agenda. In “The Indigenous Movement in Ecuador: Resource Access and Rafael
Correa’s Citizens’ Revolution”, Jima-Gonzales and Paradela-Lopez analyze how the exchange
relationship between resource types and resource access mechanisms of the Ecuadorian
indigenous movement were affected under Rafael Correa’s administration ((Jima-Gonzalez and
Paradela-Lopez, 2018). The results indicate that the exchange relationship between co-optation
and appropriation employed by Correa’s regime altered the indigenous movement’s resource
access during 2007–2017, resulting in the movement’s loss of influence and legitimacy within
the Ecuadorian political arena.
In 2008, voters in Ecuador approved a new and progressive constitution. Indigenous
leaders questioned whether the new document would benefit social movements or strengthen the
hand of President Rafael Correa, who appeared to be occupying political spaces that they had
previously held. Marc Becker argues that “Correa's relations with indigenous movements point
to the complications, limitations, and deep tensions inherent in pursuing revolutionary changes
within a constitutional framework” (Becker, 2011, pp. 47). Although indigenous movements, as
well as most social movements, shared Correa's stated desire to curtail neoliberal policies and
implement social and economic strategies that would benefit a majority of the country's people,
they increasingly clashed over how to realize those objectives. The political outcome of the new
constitution depended not on the actions of the constituent assembly but on whether organized
civil society could force the government to implement the ideals that the assembly had drafted
(Becker, 2011, pp. 47).
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CHAPTER THREE: Ecuador

Ecuador is home to 1.1 million indigenous people out of a population of more than 17
million inhabitants. There are currently 14 indigenous nationalities living in the country, grouped
into local, regional, and national organizations. According to the last recorded census in 2010,
6.8 percent of the Ecuadorian population self-identify as indigenous, which is an increase from
6.1 percent in 2001(Minority Group International, 2018).
Ecuador has a very ethnically diverse population. As of 2014, the largest ethnic group
remains Mestizos, descendants of Spanish colonists and indigenous people, who make up 71.9
percent of the population. Until the 1950s, the geography of ethnicity in Ecuador remained very
well-defined until a jump in migration. Just decades ago, most Mestizos lived in small rural
towns in the countryside, indigenous people made up much of the rural Sierra population, black
residents lived in Esmeraldas, Carchi and Imbabura provinces, while the white population
resided mostly in the large cities. Due primarily to pressure on the Sierra land resources, some
indigenous groups began migrating to the cities and many began switching their ethnic identity
to Mestizo beginning in the 1980s.
The indigenous people of Ecuador have made tremendous strides since their first
mobilizations in the 1970s and 1980s. They only comprise 20 percent of the total Ecuadorian
population, yet they are “the strongest indigenous group in the Americas” (DeShazo, 2009, p. 5).
This is mainly due to the formation of CONAIE in the 1990s. It is a political umbrella group
founded in 1986 that became a more prominent actor in local and national politics. CONAIE was
the result of an alliance between three regional indigenous organizations: Confederation of
Peoples of Kichwa Nationality (ECUARUNARI), from the Ecuadorian highlands; Confederation
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of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon (CONFENIAE), from the Amazonian
zone; and the Confederation of the Indigenous Nationalities and Peoples of the Ecuadorian Coast
(CONAICE), from the coast (Jima-Gonzalez and Paradela-Lopez, 2018, pp. 3). CONAIE
realized that different agendas within the Ecuadorian indigenous organizations could divide their
movement and avoid its national consolidation. CONAIE then functioned as the voice of the
indigenous movement, representing dozens of different indigenous organizations and identities,
and its confederative nature ensured that it maintained the spirit of the movement (JimaGonzalez and Paradela-Lopez, 2018, pp. 3). CONAIE’s efforts were often directed toward
recovering abandoned State competencies that affect indigenous populations. The organization
fostered a cultural agenda that focused on the recognition of Ecuador as a Plurinational State in
order to embed the indigenous culture within Ecuador’s cultural richness (Jima-Gonzalez and
Paradela-Lopez, 2018, pp. 4).
In 1995, CONAIE joined the Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik, (the
Pachakutik party) because of the shared goal of uniting minority voices under a single umbrella
political party. The Pachakutik party was remarkably successful in its first legislative election in
1996, winning ten percent of the seats in Ecuador’s National Assembly and at one point,
nominating a candidate for the presidency (DeShazo, 2009, pg 1). The success of the Pachakutik
was significant but short-lived. The elections in April 2009 revealed that most of the larger
parties won seats, but the Pachakutik party was not mentioned in the results and in 2013, they
only received 3.26 percent of the votes. Despite the view of CONAIE being one of the most
successful indigenous movements in Latin America, much remains to be achieved in terms of
their political representation and access to the political arena. For example, Ecuador drafted and
passed a new constitution in 1998, including provisions for indigenous political participation, yet
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this reform has not brought any substantial policy changes for them. Also, many indigenous
Ecuadorians face discrimination at the polls. The Supreme Electoral Court was reported by the
United Nations Human Rights Council as “promoting discriminatory practices against the
country’s indigenous citizens” (Amaya, 2008, p.18). This illustrates that CONAIE is making
progress, but remains an inadequate remedy to the issue.
The indigenous movement in Ecuador has been among the most successful new social
movements in Latin America since the late 1980s (Jameson, 2011, p. 63). However, the
movement had been weakened during the Correa era. An effective strategy of his government
was to “financially asphyxiate indigenous organizations” (Martinez Novo, 2019, p.141). The first
year of Correa’s government generated great expectations among CONAIE’s leaders, especially
in the second round of the presidential election, in which Alianza PAIS was impressively
supported by CONAIE (Jima-Gonzalez and Paradela-Lopez, 2018, pp. 5). However, Correa’s
government pushed for state expansion which included natural resource extraction from
indigenous territories. While Correa’s government justified it as a way of financing social
politics, the main indigenous organizations considered it a threat to their culture and values. In
fact, several authors believe that the extraction conflict deepened the degradation of the
relationship between the Ecuadorian government and CONAIE, which increased personal
animosities among several indigenous leaders and Rafael Correa (Jima-Gonzalez and ParadelaLopez, 2018, pp. 6).
Once Correa won the presidential election, it created more crises for indigenous
movements who were losing their credibility. Correa’s Citizens’ Revolution main goal was
creating solid institutions, hence the disruptive power of the indigenous movement – under this
newfound institutional logic – was no longer needed (Jima-Gonzalez and Paradela-Lopez, 2018,
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pp. 9). Through the creation of new ministries, secretaries, and governmental bodies, the politics
of the indigenous movement were openly rejected by Correa’s regime, oftentimes erasing the
movement’s strategy of defending its rights on the streets. The strengthening of both institutions
and the rule of law, located at the heart of the Citizens’ Revolution, were the aspects that clashed
the most with the “corporatist” organizational strategies employed by CONAIE and other
indigenous organizations, often equated by Correa as corrupt and illegitimate practices.
Another tactic used by the Correa administration was the use of cultural appropriation to
promote an amicable image towards the indigenous people. On his extensively known TV
program “Enlace Ciudadano,” Correa made a public display of central cultural indigenous
markers: clothing, language, and folklore (Jima-Gonzalez and Paradela-Lopez, 2018, pp. 11).
Under this logic, even though Correa maintained confrontations with the indigenous movement
on other topics, in the eyes of his TV audience he was boosting and supporting the movement’s
agenda. He later wore indigenous clothing and used ethnic decorations on his shirt as a part of a
personal marking worn in public to depict “pride” in his heritage. Gabriela Rivadeneira, the
National Assembly President from 2013–2017, adopted a similar clothing style, revealing a sense
of pride absent from previous administrations. The appropriation of these subtle cultural markers
by the most prominent public officials made a strong statement: indigenous clothing is a symbol
of Ecuadorian pride, and indigenous people are no longer the only ones entitled to proudly depict
their culture by wearing their traditional clothing publicly (Jima-Gonzalez and Paradela-Lopez,
2018, pp. 11). The timing of this played to Correa’s favor because by the time he started to use
indigenous cultural symbols, the indigenous agenda was already settled through self-production.
In the eyes of his supporters and bystanders, however, Correa openly embraced the indigenous
cultural agenda and was considered a pioneer in this regard. As a result, indigenous people could
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no longer employ their own cultural markers with the same initial force, mainly because the
progressive figure of Correa already appropriated these markers (Jima-Gonzalez and ParadelaLopez, 2018, pp. 12). Under the Correa administration, indigenous people’s cultural resources
were selectively appropriated by the regime, which served to strengthen Correa’s positive image
towards the movement and gradually reduced the movement’s potential mobilizing resources.
Aside from appropriation, the Correa government regulated the financial operations and
development work of foreign and national NGOs to control development money and the ability
of civil society to resist the regime. Under Correa, the new Organic code of Territorial
Organization, Autonomy and Decentralization (COOTAD) failed to “recognize the indigenous
community, the backbone of the indigenous movement, as a fundamental unit of the state with a
right to a budget allocation” (Martinez Novo, 2019, p.142). Instead Mestizo towns surrounded by
indigenous communities were recognized. These Mestizo councils were politically and
financially rewarded by Correa’s government and became an important social base for the
regime. The government created parallel organizations that did receive funding and state support,
meanwhile the indigenous movement lost control over their sources of funding and jobs.
Not only did the Correa government try to deplete the indigenous community’s resources,
it tried dividing them politically. Martinez Novo writes about an instance in which Marcelino
Chumpi, a Shuar leader affiliated with the indigenous left-wing Pachakutik party, “won elections
in Morona Santiago and became the province’s governor in 2009” (Martinez Novo, 2019, p.143).
Correa’s political party, Alianza PAIS, made efforts to “divide the Shuar organization by
distributing computers, boat motors and chickens to its membership” (Martinez Novo, 2019,
p.143). This resulted in a group breaking away and supporting Correa. The government also
made a large investment in the region and Correa frequently traveled to speak to the Shuar. Even
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with all the effort from Correa’s party, Chumpi was re-elected in 2014. Furthermore, the
government’s representatives began to travel to indigenous communities, diminishing the
interlocutor attribute traditionally enjoyed by CONAIE. The government started to directly fund
local communities’ projects, and establish direct contact with the movement’s grassroots in
exchange for political loyalty (Jima-Gonzalez and Paradela-Lopez, 2018, pp. 15). Clientelist
exchanges are very common during the election period in South American countries. Poor areas,
especially those with very minimal resources and exposure to commercial goods, are bribed and
bought out by financially stable parties. Past presidential candidates have brought bags of rice,
toys for small children, and some had even given out CDs with their music. This type of
campaigning minimizes the chances of indigenous candidates with very little support and money.
Martinez Novo has stated that the exacerbation of internal divisions, as well as the cooptation of
bases and leaders, could explain CONAIE’s crisis:
Correa has carried on the strategy of distributing money to the
communities, through social programs such as the Bono de Desarrollo
Humano, subsidies for housing and other programs such as Socio
Páramo and Socio Bosque (subsidies for environmental protection), in
order to coopt the bases of the movement without acknowledging
CONAIE. Indigenous leaders state that this governmental penetration
divides communities and destroys grassroots organizations (Martinez
Novo, 2019, pg. 143).

Data for indigenous participation in parliament is very scarce because it is sometimes not
reported at all. According to a 2014 Survey Report conducted by the Inter-Parliamentary Union,
it was found that Ecuador had 7 indigenous representatives in parliament. Five were male and
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two were female. However, the rest of the information is unfortunately “not available” and these
numbers were found to be a secondary source for the report. This situation brings many
questions to the table in terms of misrepresentation and if it was being done purposely by the
Correa administration.
At the beginning of his presidential period, Correa named Mónica Chuji, a Sarayaku
leader, as Head of the Communication Secretariat in his first cabinet. After a short period of
time, she became an Assembly candidate under Correa’s political party. When she won the
election, Chuji remained antagonistic towards the president, often criticizing him for turning his
political program to the Right (Jima-Gonzalez and Paradela-Lopez, 2018, pp. 11). After her
resignation from Alianza PAIS in September 2008, Chuji became an active member of the
opposition and, in 2011, she faced a very polemic trial in which she was accused of slandering
the Communication Secretary, Vinicio Alvarado. Considering these events, Chuji herself has
recognized that indigenous people’s participation in the government has an adverse effect on
communities, who often feel confused by their leader’s role and tend to reject the movement’s
organization and structure (Jima-Gonzalez and Paradela-Lopez, 2018, pp. 11).
The Ecuadorian indigenous movement’s strength developed due to the inaction of the
State and, when neo-liberal administrations were in power, the indigenous movement could
freely spread, becoming a relevant actor within the national scene. The arrival of Correa’s
Citizens Revolution (Revolución Ciudadana), however, the main purpose of which was the
institutionalization of the State, ended this period of influence for the indigenous movement,
which had begun to compete with the Ecuadorian government in both material and ideological
spheres. The movement’s once influential and persistent stance against the government was
unfortunately left in a fragile state during the Correa period. Ecuador still participated in
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exclusion, violence and discrimination towards indigenous people regardless of Correa’s
appropriation and political programs of inclusion that did not serve them. The idea of
institutionalization and labeling indigenous people as citizens implied the suppression of their
demands which is the recognition of their identities. This emphasis on individual rights excluded
indigenous peoples, with their communal-based societies. His citizens' revolution deemphasized
social movements and reinforced colonial ideologies that oppressed and erased the unique
histories of indigenous nationalities.
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CHAPTER FOUR: Bolivia

There are currently 38 recognized indigenous groups that reside in Bolivia. With the
adoption of UNDRIP and a change in their constitution, Bolivia adopted the status of a
plurinational state. Nevertheless, the country’s indigenous population still experiences
challenges. As of 2012, the Bolivian census recorded that many recognized peoples reside in the
Andes and are Quechua and Aymara, who self-identify as sixteen nations. Other groups include,
Chiquitano, Guarani, and Moxeno, as well as Afro-Bolivians, and interestingly, small
communities of Japanese and German Mennonites.
However, their 2012 census recorded a significant drop in people identifying as
indigenous from 66.4 percent in 2001to 41 percent (Minority Rights Group International,
2018). After results were finalized, it was hypothesized that the modification of the 2012 census
question on ethnic identification could have changed the data. In 2001, the question asked
whether the person identified him/herself with an ‘indigenous or native people’, while in 2012
the term ‘indigenous native peasant’ was used instead. The question was “As a Bolivian, do you
belong to an indigenous native peasant nation or people?” with a tick-box ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ answer”
(Fontana, 2013)
The decrease in the indigenous population recorded in relation to the form of the question
in the census sheds light on the discursive gaps between the rapid urbanization of the Bolivian
population and the progressive rural lifestyle of the indigenous. According to the Sheffield
Institute for International Development, “a whole debate has been going on between those who
consider that indigenous identities are relentlessly diluted as a result of increased internal
migration, and those who consider urbanization as an experience that reshapes, rather than
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destroying, indigenous identities (Fontana, 2013). Their cultures, social structures, livelihoods,
music, and languages have been shamed and discredited, and assimilation to Western cultural
norms is often considered the only way to be taken seriously in our modern world.
The status of the Bolivian indigenous, as the political minority, stands in contrast to the
fact that they are the statistical majority, making up 60 percent of the population. The 2006
election of Evo Morales was a major indigenous landmark in Bolivia’s history, as was the new
Bolivian Constitution in 2007, which includes many provisions for indigenous peoples.
Indigenous Bolivians have also aligned with a well-established political party, the Socialist
Movement Party (MAS) which led to the election of Morales. The MAS party is currently the
majority in the Chamber of Deputies. Significant legislation concerning government
decentralization reform was also passed supporting the political rights of the indigenous
Bolivians, with the aim of encouraging their political participation. The Law of Popular
Participation was adopted in 1994, leading to the creation of new municipalities (314 in total),
direct election of municipality officials, and a general increase in available resources and power
to these municipalities (Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Netherlands, 2012, p.13). This created many
opportunities for the marginalized indigenous groups to participate in decision-making processes
at the local level. Instead of political majorities dominating at the federal level, the political arena
has expanded in a more participative and democratic way.
As the largest ethnic group in Bolivia, the indigenous communities had unions that
represented them. Two of the most influential are the National Council of Ayllus and Markas of
Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ) and Unified Syndical Confederation of Rural Workers of Bolivia
(CSUTB). CONAMAQ is a confederation of traditional governing bodies of Quechua, Aymara
and Uru-speaking highland indigenous communities in the departments of La Paz, Oruro, Potosí,
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Cochabamba, Chuquisaca and Tarija, Bolivia. CSUTB is the largest union of peasants in Bolivia.
The CSUTCB was formed in 1979 in opposition to government sponsored peasant unions. These
two groups were heavily involved in creating proposals for participation of indigenous peoples in
the new constitution prior to Morales’s election.
Both groups had the proposal for the creation of a Plurinational State as their main vision
for the new constitution. According to former Ecuadorian president, Rafael Correa, the term
“plurinational” can be defined as the co-existence of several different nationalities within a larger
state. In 2005, before Morales’s election, indigenous groups published their projects based on
their visions and expectations of the new Bolivian constitution. The CSUTCB proposed the
introduction of indigenous autonomies, based on right to self-government, indigenous political
and administrative systems, territorial control (Poweska, 2013, pp. 256). They did not limit this
proposal to the municipal level, but claimed that in the territories where the large territorial
political structures of indigenous majority (Aymara, Quechua) remained, indigenous peoples
should have the right to organize large regional and even supra-regional autonomies. The union
also proposed that the indigenous have the right to elect their representatives to the national
congress according to their cultural traditions, or uses and customs, and without the interference
of the party system (Poweska, 2013, pp. 257). Finally, the union claimed the right of indigenous
peoples to be consulted by the state regarding all decisions that would affect indigenous peoples
and their territories, including the eventual exploitation of non-renewable resources in their
territories, and that this consultation should be in advance, obligatory to the state, and legally
binding. These proposals and claims seem self-explanatory for people who have lived on the
land for centuries and are the largest ethnic group in the country, however, after years of
colonization these rights have been stripped from them. They believed that with the help of a
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fellow indigenous person running for president they could regain these rights under the new
constitution.
The CONAMAQ proposals went further in claiming a radical indigenous vision for the
new state. Apart from everything postulated by the CSUTCB, CONAMAQ wanted indigenous
peoples to have an indisputable right to control all the natural resources in their territories,
including gas, oil, and other non-renewables (Poweska, 2013, pp. 257). The group proposed their
governing to be based on Andean cosmology, which is a binary unity of oppositions, system of
rotation on the national scale, and a system of pairs known as ‘chacha-warmi’. CONAMAQ, for
example, wanted the president and vice-president to represent indigenous peoples and nonindigenous inhabitants of Bolivia in rotation. This means that in one term the president would be
indigenous and vice-president non-indigenous, and in the next term it would be the other way
around.
Besides important similarities, indigenous movements disagreed on some of the demands
presented by other movements, so the various indigenous organizations decided to develop a
common proposal for the new constitution. The result was the Pacto de Unidad (Unity Pact),
presented in August 2006. Given that the Pacto de Unidad emerged from a consensus between
different movements, the most radical demands of CONAMAQ were rejected, particularly those
that were clearly inspired by the Andean point of view and did not reflect the vision of the
lowlands of Bolivia. A proposal that was rejected included the introduction of ‘Qullasuyu’ as the
new official name for the country (Poweska, 2013, pp. 258). Similarly, the two groups proposed
the claim for proportional, direct representation of indigenous peoples in the national power,
without mediation of the partisan system. However, the following year, MAS assemblymen
withdrew all the entries about direct participation from the projected texts for the new state. It
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was said that the decision about the withdrawal of the concept came from the presidential palace
(Poweska, 2013, pp. 267). Morales was already elected president during this time so to the
indigenous representatives it felt disloyal.
Although the groups agreed on this claim for direct participation, they still disagreed
when it came to the withdrawal of their entries. Some members of the CSUTCB accepted the
withdrawal and felt that that the direct representation of the indigenous “was not necessary
because indigenous peoples are in majority anyway, so no special systems of election are
needed” (Poweska, 2013, pp. 267). The comment made by the CSUTCB was rejected by
CONAMAQ:
It is not about being majority or minority. And how are we going to
count us? According to skin color? It is not about being indigenous or
Aymara (...) we want the circumscriptions corresponding to our
territorial system. It does not matter whether 60 per cent of Bolivians
declare themselves indigenous or not. We want to choose our
representatives from our territory and let the others choose their
candidates in their territories (...). The principle was that the political
parties could not control us anymore, that we do not want
manipulation and corruption. When we choose our representatives
directly from the grassroots, then we control the system and not some
partisan mechanisms. (Poweska, 2013, pp. 267).
The group protested that the government and the president were betraying indigenous peoples
and that the decision to withdraw their proposal weakened the purpose of a plurinational state,
since without direct representation there would be no recognition of the plurality of politics
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existing within the country. The conflict between the indigenous groups and MAS was causing
animosity and MAS quickly changed its position and the right to direct representation was
included in the constitutional text.
Despite progress since the first indigenous mobilization in the 1980s, the need for
improvement remains, as evidenced by the lack of adequate indigenous representation in the
Bolivian legislative bodies, the Chamber of Deputies and the Chamber of Senators. There are
only seven of 130 seats in the Chamber of Deputies reserved for representatives from indigenous
areas, indicating that pro-indigenous rhetoric surrounding increased representation proved to be
worthless. Though MAS is supported by most indigenous groups, this support emerged from the
lack of political access in the 1990s rather than from the fact that MAS accurately reflects
indigenous peoples’ views. Furthermore, information about the Law of Popular Participation has
yet to reach rural areas; therefore, indigenous peoples are unaware of its existence and the
corresponding details that apply to them, such as their available options for participation. This
proves as no surprise that indigenous peoples have not yet been elected as municipal officers.
Ultimately, indigenous Bolivians now have many codified laws to protect and to encourage their
rights, yet the legislation does not accurately reflect the reality of indigenous political access.
Evo Morales had served as president of Bolivia for nearly 14 years, creating history by
becoming the first indigenous president in the plurinational state. His first major effort was to
decolonize the state and provide an opportunity for indigenous peoples to participate in politics.
Once in office, he filled 14 of 16 positions of his cabinet with people of indigenous descent; this
included women. The women in the office were de pollera, those who wear the colorful gathered
skirts and bowler hats associated with highland indigenous descent throughout the Andean
world. Morales’s political party, the Movement toward Socialism, became the country’s
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dominant political force. It opened opportunities for indigenous leaders to enter politics as town
and city mayors, and at the regional and local levels. It would soon become the majority party in
the national legislature. Morales’s movement is in large part responsible for a massive increase
of indigenous participation in the national political process at all levels. Morales made it possible
for indigenous people not to be viewed as second-class citizens and instead be enfranchised as
indigenous.
Indigenous people have the worst socio-demographic indicators and the largest
inequalities in terms of access to social services and health in the Latin American region,
including Bolivia. Attempts to implement policies that support indigenous people's health rights
led to the development of intercultural health approaches. Under Morales’s leadership he made
the healthcare system inclusive to indigenous peoples who have different beliefs and traditions
and don’t participate in Western medicine. Article 18 guarantees the right to health and to a free,
intercultural, and participatory universal healthcare system. It’s a rebuke to the colonial and
neoliberal eras that excluded poor and Indigenous people from accessing and participating in the
public healthcare system (Hartmann, 2019).
In 2008, Morales implemented the Family, Community, and Intercultural Health (SAFCI)
model. SAFCI is a health policy which is constituted in the new way of feeling, thinking,
understanding and doing health. Reciprocally complements and articulates the health personnel
and traditional doctors of the Native Peasant Nations and Indigenous Peoples with the person,
family, community, mother earth and cosmos (Ministerio de Salud y Deportes, 2013, pp.1).
SAFCI created a paradigm shift because it intentionally attempted to decolonize an unequal
medical system which had rooted itself into Western biomedical practices. Bolivia legally
recognized Indigenous medicine in 1985, meaning providers no longer faced imprisonment for
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practicing traditional methods. Under Morales, the Vice Ministry of Intercultural Health certified
more than 5,000 Indigenous naturopaths, herbalists, and midwives. Most revolutionary is that
Indigenous medicine and practices entered the national health system (Hartmann, 2019).
Although there had been progress made, skepticism remains throughout the Bolivian
medical establishment. In a survey conducted in 2018, many indigenous healers “expressed
feeling misunderstood, underappreciated, and poorly integrated into the local health system”
(Hartmann, 2019). An indigenous healer shared that “Medical doctors don’t take us seriously.
They kick us to one side, right? I say that we should be equal because we cure people too.
Although we don’t have a medical degree, we cure people like they do” (Hartmann, 2019). The
rights and inclusiveness of indigenous peoples has been a tumultuous ride for many of them
throughout many sectors of the government.
The second half of Morales’s tenure, however, saw more conflict with indigenous
constituencies, often over competing indigenous and state priorities. Most notable among these
was the 2011 Isiboro-Sécure Indigenous Territory and National Park (TIPNIS) controversy.
Morales’s plan to facilitate trade with Brazil by building a highway through a national park, also
containing indigenous territories, provoked a backlash. Indigenous advocates saw the highway as
a betrayal privileging the country’s extraction-based national economic model over the rights of
particular indigenous groups. Morales never successfully resolved this conflict of interest during
his years in office. At the same time, a growing number of mobile city dwellers of indigenous
descent, while appreciative of Morales’s efforts, over time grew disgruntled with his
administration’s perceived exclusive focus on indigenous questions rather than economic
opportunities for all, and with his disinclination to leave office.
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Throughout Latin America, the only way for indigenous people to gain access to land
reforms, social services and several other state-organized reforms was by joining a “peasant”
organization and channeling their demands through these federations. However, according to
Yashar, “indigenous people had strong incentives to publicly forsake their ethnic identities and to
assume a class-based identity in union organizations and exchanges with political officials”
(Yashar, 2006, p. 260). They also complemented corporatist measures with educational programs
designed to promote assimilation. In Bolivia, “such assimilationist programs were put into
place…to incorporate people perceived as backwards into the ranks of a new, and presumably
more civilized nation” (Yashar, 2006, p. 260). She also notes that, “states encouraged indigenous
men and women to discard any public display of indigenous identity, [and] encouraged the
adoption of mestizo identities” (Yashar, 2006, p. 261). By changing their ethnic status from
indigenous to mestizo, it allowed them to “depoliticize ethnic cleavages” (Yashar, 2006, p. 261).
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CHAPTER FIVE: Ecuador and Bolivia, A Comparison

Indigenous populations in the Andean region of Latin America have played an
increasingly larger role in local politics in the past two decades, with some successes at the
national level as well. In Ecuador and Bolivia, people who self-identified as indigenous profited
from political reforms aimed at decentralization, promotion of greater autonomy for local and
municipal government, and expanded political participation.
Both countries had the opportunity to change their constitutions, giving indigenous
groups the chance to propose new platforms and programs for the advancement of their
movements. On September 28, 2008, voters in Ecuador approved a new constitution by a wide
margin. This was the country's twentieth constitution since becoming an independent republic in
1830. Under the guidance of the young and charismatic president Rafael Correa, the constitution
promised to bring an end to neoliberal policies that had shifted wealth from marginalized peoples
to elite corporate interests (Becker, 2011, pp. 47). The 2008 constituent assembly provided a
turning point for indigenous movements by introducing a historic opportunity to decolonize the
country's political structures. Indigenous leaders emphasized that the revisions they had proposed
to Ecuador's constitution would benefit everyone in the country, not just indigenous peoples.
Correa’s political movement Alianza Pais had won 70 percent of the vote for the
assembly. Its margin of victory was due, in part, to some activists who broke from the
indigenous-led Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik (United Plurinational Pachakutik
Movement, referred to as Pachakutik) and joined Correa's party (Becker, 2011, pp. 50). Two of
the prominent indigenous members who had joined Correa’s party were Monica Chuji, one of
the more radical members of Correa’s party who declared her allegiance to CONAIE’s
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movement, and Pedro de la Cruz, the president of the Confederacion Nacional de Organizaciones
Campesinas, Indigenas, y Negras (National Confederation of Peasant, Indigenous and Negro
Organizations, FENOCIN). De la Cruz had been an alternative congressional deputy for the
socialist party and won the election to become a delegate for Alianza Pais. Many indigenous
activists believed that they could most effectively influence the content of the constitution by
working within Correa’s government. However, as seen in other instances, Leftist parties and
social movements did not fare any better than their conservative opponents in gaining seats in the
assembly. Pachakutik won only four seats and, together with the traditional parties, was left
behind as an increasingly marginalized and irrelevant political force. Correa’s opponents
complained that his approach favored liberal, individualistic politics and that decision-making
processes in Alianza Pais were highly centralized and authoritarian. Correa "acted in a more
strategic, although highly 'top-down fashion" than Evo Morales's Movimiento al Socialismo
(Movement Toward Socialism) in Bolivia (Becker, 2011, pp. 51). There would not have been
true structural change without the participation of social movements. Indigenous groups feared
that Correa’s victories would come at their expense.
As in Bolivia, the idea of a plurinational state for indigenous peoples emphasized
inclusion of their culture and identity. They did not want to assimilate, but instead be recognized
as a partner in the state. Indigenous activists reinforced the importance of political changes,
specifically the demand for acknowledgement of the plurinational characteristic of the country.
Aside from the recognition of the 14 indigenous nationalities, they wanted acknowledgement of
the systems of life, education and economy that were different from those of the dominant
society (Becker, 2011, pp. 51-52). Cecilia Velasque, former public attorney with the national
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Department of Indigenous Peoples and Communities, and Coordinator of REMPE (the Network
of Political Women of Ecuador), says:
Plurinationality signifies the recognition and self-determination of
indigenous peoples; that there will be a political sphere of government by
and for indigenous peoples. But plurinationality has been forgotten in the
economic model, has been forgotten in environmental policy and in the
management of natural resources, has been forgotten in the area of water,
has been forgotten in the area of culture, has been forgotten in the area of
the decolonization of public and private institutions. Because colonialism
still thrives in Ecuador; there is discrimination against indigenous people,
it marginalizes us, it expresses itself through racism, it excludes and it
minimalizes the existence of indigenous peoples (Llewellyn, 2014).
CONAIE had proposed for the following statement, "Ecuador constitutes a plurinational,
sovereign, communitarian, social and democratic, independent, secular, solidarity, unitary state
with gender equality", to be the definition for the state in its new constitution. However, the
constituent assembly refused to begin the definition with the word “plurinational” and instead
agreed to include the word in the text (Becker, 2011, pp. 53). Article 1 of Ecuador’s constitution
declared that it was a: “constitutional state of rights and justice, social, democratic, sovereign,
independent, unitary, intercultural, plurinational, and secular (Republica del Ecuador, 2008). The
term raised controversy as a radical interpretation of it was perceived as separatist. Monica Chuji
argues “that interculturality and plurinationality are not opposite concepts. While interculturality
recognizes the differences within a society, the recognition of a Plurinational State would allow
the translation of that recognition into concrete rights, and the implementation and enforcement
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of concrete policies” (Jima-Gonzalez, 2018, pp. 18). Similar to Bolivia, there were many debates
on the language and how to really define the term “plurinational.” CONAIE wanted the word to
be used to empower indigenous peoples, including granting them control over their lands. Unlike
Bolivia, who took the actual word and made it a dominant factor in its state, Ecuador simply
desired to leave the term vaguely defined, essentially ensuring that it would remain on the level
of rhetoric without any significant substance (Becker, 2011, pp. 54). This ultimately affected the
way that the indigenous movements were viewed during Correa’s administration, which lasted a
decade. Legally, Ecuador is a plurinational state that recognizes indigenous peoples’ collective
rights, languages and traditional forms of justice. The constitution celebrates the contributions of
indigenous peoples and guarantees rights to self-determination, including to ancestral territories.
Yet, they are still treated as second-class citizens whose concerns seem irrelevant in Ecuadorian
politics.
In Bolivia, their indigenous groups had to go through the same struggle. However, what
makes Bolivia different is the nomination of their first indigenous president which has not
happened in Ecuador. The debates in their constitution, as mentioned earlier, also dealt with the
language that would be used and the definition for the term plurinational. This was also their
general demand that they wanted viewed as a concept binding all other indigenous claims
together. Comparable to Ecuador, Bolivia’s MAS party approached the proposal with
ambivalence because they did not want to “antagonize the middle-class, which viewed the
proposal with great reservation, or even hostility, because of the anxiety that the ‘plurinational
state’ would lead to ethnic resentments and provoke division of the country” (Poweska, 2013, pp.
260). While the indigenous were not able to win every proposal brought forth for the new
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constitution, they did manage to change Bolivia’s name to the Plurinational State of Bolivia
which increases their empowerment and their right to be perceived.
The two Andean states are predominantly Spanish speaking, but with a major indigenous
population in both countries, indigenous groups tried to propose the inclusion for one of their
languages to be considered a main language. Ecuadorians’ struggle in the assembly was whether
Kichwa and other indigenous languages would be granted official status. CONAIE argued that
interculturality is a matter for every Ecuadorian and when a language is lost “a vision of the
world disappears” (Becker, 2011, pp. 55). Alianza Pais, Correa’s party, voted against the
proposal to grant the language official status. Correa’s belief was that, in much of the country,
learning English was more important than learning Kichwa (Becker, 2011, pp. 56). Nevertheless,
the proposal underwent review again after backlash from indigenous government officials.
Article 2 of the constitution now states “Spanish is Ecuador’s official language; Spanish, Kichwa
and Shuar are official languages for intercultural ties. The other ancestral languages are in
official use by indigenous peoples in the areas where they live and in accordance with the terms
set forth by law. The State shall respect and encourage their preservation and use” (Republica del
Ecuador, 2008). While some considered it just as vague as the wording of plurinational in the
constitution, it did mark progress in the way indigenous groups refused to back down on matters
that are important to them. They used the same tenacity that brought them into the spotlight
during the 1990s. Bolivia’s constitution also includes Spanish as the main language for the
country. During their constitutional process, there were some groups, like those from Potosi, who
proposed that “all the politicians and state administration should speak indigenous languages”
(Poweska, 2013, pp. 197). Their main goal was for their range of indigenous languages to be
included in the constitution and officially recognized on all administrative and institutional levels

Yepez

36

of the Bolivian state. Their constitution had initially recognized 36 languages. According to
Article 5 Section 1 of the Bolivian constitution:
The official languages of the State are Spanish and all the languages
of the rural native indigenous nations and peoples, which are Aymara,
Araona, Baure, Bésiro, Canichana, Cavineño, Cayubaba, Chácobo,
Chimán, Ese Ejja, Guaraní, Guarasu'we, Guarayu, Itonama, Leco,
Machajuyai-kallawaya, Machineri, Maropa, Mojeñotrinitario,
Mojeño-ignaciano, Moré, Mosetén, Movima, Pacawara, Puquina,
Quechua, Sirionó, Tacana, Tapiete, Toromona, Uruchipaya,
Weenhayek, Yaminawa, Yuki, Yuracaré and Zamuco (Plurinational
State of Bolivia, 2009).
The constitution does make it a point to enforce that Spanish must be used:
The Pluri-National Government and the departmental governments
must use at least two official languages. One of them must be
Spanish, and the other shall be determined taking into account the use,
convenience, circumstances, necessities and preferences of the
population as a whole or of the territory in question. The other
autonomous governments must use the languages characteristic of
their territory, and one of them must be Spanish (Plurinational State
of Bolivia, 2009).
As of 2019, Bolivia had added three more indigenous languages to be included in the
constitution, making the number of languages 39. For a country that was electing its first
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indigenous president, it was important for the indigenous movements to be recognized and honor
the culture Morales grew up in.
Aside from issues of identification, one of the biggest issues affecting indigenous groups
in both Ecuador and Bolivia are the violations of their respective governments regarding their
land and human rights by investment projects that threaten their social and physical environment.
For decades, indigenous groups have taken to the streets (or wherever they can be heard) to
protest these violations of their rights.
In Ecuador, the focus of recent protests has been the proposed development of the mining
potential in the highlands. Ecuador, up to now, has not been a mining country, but it has come
under increasing interest from international companies, especially from Canada and China,
which are keen to take advantage of the strong demand for minerals and high global prices.
According to Crabtree,
[T]he development of mining has raised serious questions about rights
to water and protection from environmental hazards, and threatens
traditional ways of life. There have been several protest movements in
recent years about who should control water distribution: the central
government, local governments or local communities.
(Crabtree, 2012).
The government, despite its left-wing discourse and laws on prior consultation, has firmly
defended its right to enter concession agreements with foreign mining companies. In 2008,
Correa made changes to the constitution to further include participation of the indigenous;
however, the constitution includes some ambiguities regarding natural resources. There has been
“confirmation that nonrenewable resources belong to the state and that indigenous communities
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have no special power over decision-making on their use” (De Shazo, 2009, p. 6). This violates
both national and international law, in which governments are required to undergo a free, prior
and informed consent process with communities before beginning any extraction projects near
their territory to warn them of the negative repercussions and seek their consent.
In Bolivia, President Evo Morales won the votes of the indigenous because of his
indigenous background and the protections he promised them. Years into his presidency, he fell
into the same cycle as Ecuador by joining forces with China to expand development.
According to a report conducted by the International Federation of Human Rights, Bolivia
imposed oil exploration projects such as the oil block “Nueva Esperanza” (New Hope), which
overlaps with one of the three territories of the Tacana indigenous people. This territory is home
to an indigenous people who live in voluntary isolation, the “Toromona.” Although the Tacana
opposed the state exploration, in 2013 the Bolivian State won and reached an agreement with the
oil companies BGP Bolivia, and the state company China National Petroleum Corporation
(CNPC), in charge of exploration, to safeguard the territory and protect the Tacana and
Toromona peoples. However, BGP ignored the agreements and caused environmental damage
affecting the indigenous people’s livelihoods. (International Federation of Human Rights, 2018).
Another incident occurred soon after the formation of the Plurinational State of Bolivia in
2009. The Isiboro Sécure National Park and Indigenous Territory (TIPNIS) became the epicenter
of a conflict over the construction of a road, initiated by Evo Morales’ administration, that would
run through the park. Initially undertaken by the Brazilian company OAS, and funded by the
Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), the project was justified on the grounds that it would
link the Departments of Beni and Cochabamba, and bring development to an isolated locality.
However, indigenous peoples from the lowlands opposed this development proposal and,
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together with their counterparts in the Andean region, organized a march that was violently
dispersed by the Bolivian armed forces.
Nevertheless, indigenous groups are fighting and making strides to oppose the corporate
greed that the countries are participating in. In early April 2019, more than 200 Waorani people
marched to the court in the Ecuadorian city of Puyo to begin their hearing against the Ecuadorian
government. After long protesting oil extraction in its territory, the community sued three
government bodies - the Ministry of Energy and Non-renewable Natural Resources, the
Secretary of Hydrocarbons and the Ministry of Environment - for violating their rights by
conducting a faulty consultation process with the community and putting their territory up for an
international oil auction. According to both national and international law, communities must be
consulted before any extraction process is planned on or near their territory in what is called the
free, prior and informed consultation process. The Waorani community said the consultation
process was only a series of presentations by the government about how oil money would benefit
their community, but said nothing about the negative environmental effects of extraction
projects. Because of the 2012 consultation process with the Waorani, and seven other indigenous
nationalities, the Amazon rainforest was divided into 16 different oil blocks and put up for sale
in an international oil auction. Last year, the government reduced the size of the oil auction to
two blocks, removing block 22 that overlaps Waorani territory, but it quickly added that the
region would not be exempt from future drilling plans. Lina Maria Espinosa is the community’s
lawyer and has said that “the life of the Waorani is closely linked to its territory, and this
territory is threatened by extractive activities, and the perspective of a Western world that
ignores and denies interculturality and the relationship of these peoples with their
territory,"(Brown, 2019). This has been a recurring issue throughout many indigenous territories
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in developing countries because of outside countries coming in to build, or in Ecuador’s case,
drill for oil. Oil has always been an important part of Ecuador's economy, contributing to much
of its growth from 2006 to 2014, according to the World Bank. The socialist policies of former
President Rafael Correa, and investments in education and social programs, funded largely from
oil revenues, helped lower the poverty rate by 15 percent. But this economy has also angered
indigenous communities in the Amazon rainforest, who have seen the oil industry cause
contamination and community displacement.
In the historic ruling, the judges highlighted several ways in which the consultation
process was inadequate and violated the community's right to self-determination. According to
the tribunal, during these consultation meetings: There was no real dialogue with communities,
they were called without enough prior notice, there were not enough elders present, and there
were no clear translations into the local Waorani language, among other problems. However, this
is the second community to win a major lawsuit against the Ecuadorian government in recent
years. Last year, the indigenous Kofan community in the northern Amazon sued the same three
government bodies for allowing mining operations to continue near their territory, without
undergoing a consultation process. Four judges ruled in the community's favor and 52 mining
concessions were cancelled.
These types of rulings can give indigenous communities aspirations that their hard work
and rights should matter regardless of their economic, cultural or social standing. Governments
try to take advantage of these situations and the lack of resources these communities may have,
but with the help of organizations they can be properly represented.
Currently, both Correa and Morales are out of office in their respective countries. While
they tried to continue their presidencies, their citizens ultimately decided they were done with
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their governing and it was time for change. President Correa finished his term in 2017 after 10
tumultuous years. Their current president, Lenin Moreno, has implemented policy changes aimed
at repairing damage suffered by democratic institutions during former President Rafael Correa’s
decade in power. The changes have fostered a climate of open debate, but structural reforms are
still needed. Albeit, President Moreno has been more active in allowing indigenous peoples to
protest and voice their opinions for change, unlike Correa who had prohibited demonstrations as
well as jailed the demonstrators. In 2019, Indigenous groups took to the streets to protest
austerity measures imposed by Moreno that disproportionately affected them. This policy has
benefited multinational corporations, the banks, and in general, powerful economic groups, at the
expense of the middle and working classes, who are being pushed toward poverty and extreme
poverty (Salgado, 2019). Moreno reached an agreement with indigenous groups to cancel the
decision to eliminate fuel subsidies that sparked the protests, but the spirit of the movement also
represents much more. Indigenous groups are taking back the political space that was taken away
under Correa’s administration.
Presently, Correa has been convicted on corruption charges and sentenced to eight years
in prison. Correa was among 20 people, including his vice president, Jorge Glas, accused of
accepting $8 million in bribes in exchange for public contracts from 2012 and 2016. The former
president left Ecuador three years ago to Belguim, and his conviction, which he can appeal,
leaves him subject to arrest if he returns (Leon Cabrera, 2019). The Court also banned him from
participating in politics for the next 25 years. Correa denied the charges, describing them as a
form of political persecution intended to prevent him and his allies from running in future
national elections. Although he had vowed to retire from politics in 2017, he had shown interest
in running for office in 2021 but if his conviction stands, that would be prevented. It is not
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uncommon in Latin American countries for former presidents to be convicted on charges of
bribery. It has happened many times before, in many countries, and this is one aspect that Latin
Americans wish would change and stop for the betterment of the country and the people in it.
Bolivia’s former president Morales fled the country in November 2019, with just the
clothes on his back and without a passport, to Mexico. He was accused of trying to steal an
election, and the country’s military chief publicly suggested that he resign. Since then, Bolivia
had been fiercely divided. His departure brought an abrupt end to one of the most historic
presidencies. Several of his highest-ranking officials resigned along with him, including the three
people after him in the line of presidential succession. The office was claimed by conservative
Jeanine Añez, who is a former television presenter and had a brief position in the Bolivian
Senate. Within two days, Añez was endorsed by the military and proclaimed herself president,
donning the sash of office as generals looked on approvingly. She alienated the indigenous
population just as quickly, leading a group of followers to the Presidential Palace, where she
raised an oversized Bible and declared that she was “returning the Bible to the palace”
(Anderson, 2020), despite the constitution proclaiming Bolivia to be a secular nation. Añez then
named an all-white cabinet, setting all the work accomplished by Morales and Bolivian
indigenous groups many steps back. In addition, she signed a decree prohibiting “personality
cults” in Bolivia’s institutions, and made it clear that she intended to purge Morales’s legacy and
his presence from public life (Anderson, 2020). Most egregious in the aftermath of Morales’s
ouster is the indiscriminate killing of approximately 30 peaceful protesters, many indigenous.
The military opened fire after Añez issued a decree exempting the army and police from criminal
responsibility for actions taken to restore order; after much internal outcry and international
pressure, the decree has since been annulled (Hartmann, 2019). For many, Añez stokes fears of
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colonialism and repressive dictatorships that silenced indigenous cultures. However, Añez
believes that she is the liberator that Bolivia needs from Morales’s politics of class division.
According to Añez:
This was fourteen years of dictatorship, fourteen years of lies,
fourteen years of oppression, from which we are trying to free
Bolivians, to bring about a transition that can become a new starting
point, a place where no one prohibits us from thinking differently.
(Anderson, 2020).
Previously, Bolivia’s presidents had been forbidden to serve consecutive terms, but a
new provision allowed two in a row. In 2013, as Morales approached his two-term
limit, he convinced the courts that his first term, which came before the constitution
was amended, shouldn’t count toward his total; the following year, he won office
again. In 2016, Morales tried yet another ploy - he held a referendum asking
Bolivians to overrule the constitution and allow him a fourth term. Voters rejected
his request, but the constitutional courts ruled that not allowing Morales to run would
violate his human rights (Anderson, 2020). His opposition held protests, however, he
still held widespread support among indigenous and poor citizens. On election night,
he was leading in votes but needed just ten more votes to avoid a second round of
voting. He called a halt on the election and 24 hours after it resumed, he had
coincidentally reached the margin of votes needed. There was outcry of fraud, and
after an investigation from the Organization of American States (OAS), he knew it
was time to resign.
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Currently, Morales has moved to Argentina and continues to support
candidates running for elections in May. Similar to Ecuador, there have been at least
a hundred and sixty people, including senior officials from Morales’s party, that have
been prosecuted or detained, on accusations that range from corruption and terrorism
to “making illegal appointments” (Anderson, 2020). Until elections are over, the
indigenous people are in the hands of interim president Añez. They must fight and
sustain that determination to keep their plurinationality for years to come.
Indigenous people have seen struggle and have fought through these adversities in both
Bolivia and Ecuador. Their oppression and marginalization continues, but with each protest and
demonstration they get closer to their goal and the bright future they see for themselves.
Recognition seems like the easiest task a state can offer, however after years of colonization and
colonial mentalities, it is hard to leave those ideals behind. Ultimately, with the help of human
rights and indigenous groups, the original people of Ecuador and Bolivia can continue to practice
their culture, language, beliefs, education and medicine without the fear of being persecuted or
misrepresented with each passing presidential administration.
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CHAPTER SIX: Conclusion
As illustrated above, the indigenous people of Bolivia and Ecuador have extremely
different political statuses; however, they all face the same key impediments to having adequate
political representation and access. These obstacles are either developmental or cultural.
Developmentally, the indigenous people lack physical infrastructure, adequate healthcare, and
access to education. Because the majority of indigenous people live in rural and geographically
hard-to-reach areas, there needs to be a way by which information can reach the indigenous
communities; this deficiency is illustrated by the lack of knowledge regarding the Law of
Popular Participation in Bolivia. If the indigenous are not in good health and are illiterate,
becoming politically involved becomes nearly impossible. The fact that “indigenous” has
become synonymous with “impoverished” and “poor” ultimately demonstrates the
developmental obstacles that have impeded their political participation. Culturally, the
hegemonic discrimination faced by the indigenous people even by federal institutions has proven
to be extremely problematic. The highly complex nature of this issue suggests it will not be
solved soon unless drastic economic and cultural changes are made. It is only with perseverance
and dedication on the part of the indigenous, with support from the international community, that
human rights may finally be realized for this vulnerable population. The key to actualizing
human rights for indigenous peoples lies in their legitimate and successful political participation.
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